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THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF OIL PRICE
REGULATION
JOSEPH P. KALT
Cambridge: MIT Press. 1983. Pp. 372. $12.50
This volume, subtitled "Federal Policy in the Post-Embargo Era," is
one of the MIT Press Series on the Regulation of Economic Activity. It
was published over two years ago; the present review is of the paperback
edition issued in 1983.
As the subtitle indicates, the book is concerned with regulation of oil
prices during the period 1973-80, with a retrospective glance at 1971
when price regulation began, but not much at the period of promotion,
protectionism and prorationing of oil before that. It is unfortunate that
the analysis could not have included the post-deregulation era from early
1981 to the present. The behavior of prices and the distribution of gains
since 1981 would have provided a useful additional comparative test of
some of the author's findings-particularly of his strongly felt conviction
that the multi-level Windfall Profits Tax perpetuates regulation on the
supply side of the market by substituting tax-based regulation for price
controls.
The study originated as a Ph.D. dissertation, but it is remarkably free
of the clutter of unnecessary detail that frequently mars published theses.
Kalt's major findings are clear, concisely expressed, and supported by
analysis that is deft and thorough, making use of the best theoretical and
quantitative methods available to the specialist in industrial organization.
His estimates of the net transfers of economic rent and of the deadweight
losses associated with price controls are pioneering applications of the
methodology, and are entirely convincing. This volume should be-and
probably has already become-a standard addition to every energy econ-
omist's library. Among other things, its catalogue of federal oil regulations
during the decade of the 1970s is highly useful.
Professor Kalt's findings on the central issues of allocation efficiency
and redistributive effects are:
(1) U.S. oil policy in the 1970s was largely a response to conflicts
over distribution of income and the redistributive effects of very large
price increases of petroleum, not to any "massive failure of domestic
markets to allocate energy resources optimally" (p. 293).
(2) Multi-tier crude oil price ceilings combined with the entitlements
program which redistributed surpluses did hold domestic crude prices
below levels that they would have attained without controls, but at the
same time they reduced domestic crude oil output in a range of 0.3 to
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1.4 million barrels per day and subsidized crude oil imports to the extent
of 10 to 20 percent of their cost.
(3) Controls diverted huge amounts of economic rent from domestic
crude producers to others; over the decade, about 60 percent went to
refiners, and about 40 percent to refined-product consumers. However,
the deadweight losses resulting from the controls extinguished some of
these rents. For example, Kalt estimates that in 1979 some $32.6 billion
was transferred from crude oil producers, of which $21.8 billion went to
refiners and $8.3 billion to consumers, while the economy suffered dead-
weight losses of $2.5 billion (p. 216).
(4) The Windfall Profits Tax will probably reduce domestic production
of crude by some 1 million barrels per day, and produce deadweight
losses of $1-2 billion per year.
The author includes an analysis of the political economy of oil price
controls, which is interesting though somewhat convoluted. The voting
behavior of members of the Senate on petroleum regulations shows that
they have not always voted for the economic interests of their constituents;
some votes have been motivated by what Kalt calls "altruism" or alter-
natively "ideology"-the conception of the "public interest" held by the
legislator. Whether such controls re4y have-been in the public interest
by any meaningful standard for that phase is, of course, what every reader
of the book will have to decide for himself. There is no way to judge
the actual redistributions by any objective test, but the author shows that
if distributive "justice" was the aim of the policy it was bought at con-
siderable cost in allocative efficiency (lost income and output), and implies
that its actual redistributive effects have not been entirely in the direction
of greater equity. These inferences once more affirm the view held by
most economists that price controls on commodities are poor instruments
for "improving" the distribution of income.
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